This research examines the mechanisms that lead women to spend more time than men on lowpromotability tasks. In particular, we examine whether gender differences found in previous research-women receiving more requests than men to do these tasks and women being more likely to accept such requests-are exacerbated by the prospect of penalties for declining the request. We replicate these prior findings and find no evidence that penalties exacerbate the gender differences. In addition, we find that men more than women penalize others for saying "no."
allocation of low-promotability tasks. One might expect that penalties for failure to help another person would be harsher on women than men as helping behavior is more normative for women than for men (Eagly & Steffen 1984; Williams & Best 1990; Lueptow et al.1995) and a large body of research in social psychology finds that individuals are penalized when they deviate from normative gender stereotypes. For example, research has shown that women who behave in a dominant manner (Eagly et al. 1992; Bowles et al. 2007; Rudman & Glick 2001) or say "no" to a request to help another person (Heilman & Chen 2005) are judged more negatively than men.
I. Experiment: How Does the Risk of Penalty Affect the

Demand and Supply of Low-Promotability Tasks?
We conduct an experiment to explore how the possibility of imposing a penalty for noncompliance affects who is asked to perform low-promotability tasks (demand), who agrees to perform low-promotability tasks (supply), and in particular whether gender influences these decisions. We also explore the penalty decisions and whether these are influenced by gender. We adopt an experimental design used in our previous research, which mirrors the incentives faced by a decision maker who needs to find a volunteer to perform a low-promotability task.
A. Design
Using a slightly modified version of the experimental setup of Babcock et al. (2017) as a baseline, we add a treatment where participants could be punished for saying "no" to a request to perform the task. 1 Participants are randomly and anonymously assigned to groups of four and shown the "profiles" of the three individuals they are paired with. These profiles contain demographic information about each person's age, gender, whether he or she was born in the US, year in school, and major (business, social science, or other major). They are informed that one person will be designated the role of "red" player and the other three will be designated the role of "green"
players. The three green players are given 2 minutes to make an investment (volunteering) decision. If no one invests during the two minutes, then all green players and the red player each earn $1. If one green player invests, then that person earns $1.25 and the other two green players and the red player each earn $2. The round ends when the 2 minutes are up or when someone invests. The red player cannot invest, and is charged with making a request to one of the green players to make the investment (which the green player can refuse by not investing). Before it is learned who in the group will be the red player, all players decide who they will ask to invest should they be assigned the role of the red player. It is then announced to the group which group member is the red player and which green player the red player asked to invest. After roles are assigned and requests are announced, green players participate in the 2-minute investment decision, where every green player has the option of being the one who invests. Participants are randomly assigned to new groups and roles in each of the ten rounds.
We have two experimental conditions-a control treatment as described above-and a backlash treatment in which the red player can penalize the green player who is asked to invest.
For each of the three possible scenarios (no one invests, a green player different from the player who was asked invests, and the green player who was asked invests), the red player can decrease the earnings of the asked green player. The cost of punishment to the red player is $0.01 to decrease the earnings of the asked green player by $0.03. The red player can choose to deduct an amount between $0.00 and $0.75 from the asked green player's earnings.
B. Participants and Procedures
We 
C. Results
Group Decisions. The distribution of investment time within the two-minute interval is bimodal (see Table B1 in online appendix). Many investments occur in the last two seconds of the round Requests (Demand-Side Response) . As seen in Figure 1 , red players make more strategy-method requests of female green players than of male green players in each treatment, (8.87 requests are received by male compared to 11.07 by female green players in the control treatment, p<0.001; and 8.50 requests are received by male compared to 11.50 by female green players in the backlash treatment, p<0.001) 3 , replicating prior findings. However, unlike previous research, this result only holds for male red players: Male red players make more requests of female compared to male green players (p<0.001 in control, and p<0.001 in backlash) while female red players do not 2 There are some significant differences in the demographic characteristics of the participants across gender and experimental treatments. We therefore include demographic controls when possible in our analyses. 3 Unless otherwise noted all tests reported are two-sided subject-level t-tests.
discriminate between male and female green players (p=0.319 in control, and p=0.348 in backlash). 4 Contrary to our expectations, the backlash treatment does not increase gender differences in the number of strategy method requests (see online Appendix Table B2 ).
5 Figure 1 . Number of requests received in a session (strategy method) by gender
Response to requests (Supply-Side Response) . How do green players respond to being asked to invest? Relative to not being asked, getting a request to volunteer significantly increases the probability of making the investment (it increases from 21.0 percent to 54.5 percent in the control treatment, p<0.001; and from 13.0 percent to 67.5 percent in the backlash treatment, p<0.001).
There is a 6.2 percentage point difference between the likelihood that female green players versus 4 These are two-sided one-sample subject-level t-tests of the null hypothesis that the likelihood of asking a female to invest in mixed gender groups is equal to the share of females in the group. 5 Pooling over both treatments, in a regression of the number of strategy method requests received in a session that controls for the other demographic information on the profiles and uses wild bootstrapped standards errors clustered at the session level, the coefficient on female is 1. Total times asked to invest male green players agree to the request in the control treatment (57.3 percent for female versus 51.1 percent for male green players), and the difference is 17.6 percentage points in the backlash treatment (76.2 percent for female versus 58.6 percent for male green players). In a probit analysis of the probability of investing (Table 1) , we find that the increase in volunteering when asked is greater for women than it is for men (though the difference is marginally insignificant), and that this gender difference does not differ by experimental treatment. Given that women receive more requests to volunteer than men and that they have a greater likelihood of agreeing to requests than men when asked, this implies that if a representative sample of strategy method requests was drawn, together the channels of increased "demand" and increased "supply" would lead women to volunteer 40 percent more than men in the control treatment and 76 percent more than men in the backlash treatment.
Who penalizes and who is penalized for saying "no" to a request to volunteer? Within the backlash condition there are interesting gender differences in the red players' decisions to penalize. When the group fails to make an investment, male red players impose significantly higher penalties on the green player who was asked to invest than do female red players (18.9 cents on average by male, and 6.5 cents on average by female red players, p=0.003, see online Appendix Table B3 .)
Importantly, the amount of earnings deductions does not differ by the gender of the green player who was asked to invest (p=0.139 for male red players and p=0.190 for female red players). While the size of the penalty differs by the gender of the red player who penalizes, there is no gender difference in the probability of imposing a penalty should the group fail to make the investment (47.9 percent for male red players, and 44.1 percent for female red players, p=0.788).
II. Conclusion
Previous research has found that women spend more time than men on low-promotability tasks, which are tasks that benefit all group members but that each group member prefers someone else completes. This research builds on prior studies and explores the mechanisms that lead to these gender differences. We examine whether gender differences in who is asked to perform these types of tasks and who says "yes" to requests to perform these tasks are exacerbated by the prospect of penalties for declining to do the task. We replicate previous findings (Babcock et al. 2017 ) that women receive more requests than men to do low-promotability tasks. However, this gender difference is unaffected by the prospect of a penalty for non-compliance. We also replicate the finding that women respond more favorably than men to agree to a request, although again this gender difference is not influenced by the prospect of a penalty.
The fact that the prospect of penalties failed to affect requests or compliance with requests may be driven by the fact that both the frequency and magnitude of observed penalties were small.
The total frequency of positive penalties observed by subjects when the asked person did not invest was 38 percent and meaningful penalties (in excess of 5 cents) were only seen in 61 percent of these cases. Penalties may thus not have been very salient to participants. It may be of interest to examine the role of penalties in environments where it is not a dominant strategy to invest and where the group's rate of success is lower.
We also find large gender differences in the size of penalties imposed for failing to agree to do the task, with men imposing larger penalties than women. This result is intriguing as when men themselves were asked to volunteer, and faced the prospect of a penalty for failing to volunteer, they were less likely than women to agree to the request to volunteer.
Together with Babcock et al. (2017) this research suggests that the mechanisms that lead women to perform more low-promotabililty tasks than men are robust and that interventions may be required to eliminate them. For example, pointing out the inequities generated by these gender differences may change the behavior of requestors and respondents, or imposing minimum targets of participation in these types of tasks might level the playing field for women.
Introduction
Thank you for participating in our study. This is an experiment about decision making. The other people in this room are also participating in the experiment. You must not talk to them or communicate with them in any way. If you have a question please raise your hand and one of us will come to where you are sitting to answer you in private.
During the experiment you will make decisions in 10 rounds. In each round you will be randomly matched with three other people to form a group of four. Your earnings will depend on the decisions made by you and by your group members. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in private and in cash. Your payment will equal the sum of your earnings from each of the 10 rounds plus $6 for showing up to the experiment.
Identity and roles
We will use the information you provided at the beginning of the experiment to create your individual profile. In each round we will show you the individual profiles of the three other group members you are matched with. At the beginning of each round you and your group members will be randomly assigned roles. One member of the group will be assigned the role of red player and the remaining three members of the group will be assigned the role of green players. Green players form an investment group and can make an investment. The red player cannot make an investment. The earnings of all four group members depend on the investment choices made by the three green players.
Decisions and Earnings
In each round the three green players form an investment group and have 120 seconds to individually decide whether to invest in the group account. The round ends when the 120 seconds are up or when someone invests. If no one invests, each group member earns $1 for the round. If a green player invests before the 120 seconds are up, then that individual earns $1.25 for the round and the other group members each earn $2 for the round. If multiple green players invest at the exact same time, then it is randomly determined which player's investment choice counts and therefore which player earns $1.25.
If you are selected to be a red player, you earn $2 if a green player invests and you earn $1 if no green player invests. As a red player you cannot invest. However, as the red player you can ask a green player to invest. In each round you will indicate which player you would like to ask before it is determined whether you are the red player. That is, prior to knowing your role, all members will indicate which green player they would like to ask to invest.
[BACKLASH: Conditional on the outcome of the investment round, you will also make a decision about whether and how you would like to decrease the earnings of the green player you asked to invest. It will cost you 1 cent to deduct 3 cents from the earnings of the group member you asked to invest. For example, if you deduct 30 cents from the earnings of the green player you asked to invest, your earnings will decrease by 10 cents and the green player's earnings will decrease by 30 cents. You can deduct up to 75 cents of the green player's earnings.]
When the round begins, one group member is randomly selected to be the red player, and it is revealed which green player the red player asked to invest. After each round all participants learn if an investment was made and whether the green player who was asked to invest made the investment.
[BACKLASH: Conditional on the outcome of the investment round, all players learn if and how much the red player chose to decrease the earnings of the green player who was asked to invest.]
Request Screen
Below you see a screenshot of the request stage. In the upper left corner you see the round number. The profiles of the three other members of your group are shown below. The order of the profiles and their group member number differs within the group. You can indicate who you would like to ask to invest by marking your preferred option. Your choice is only revealed to the other members of your group if you are randomly assigned the role of red player.
[BACKLASH: Earnings Deduction Screen The earnings deduction screen indicates which group member you would like to ask to invest if you are assigned the role of red player. The screen also gives you the opportunity to decrease this player's earnings conditional on all possible outcomes of the investment round. It will cost you 1 cent to deduct 3 cents from the earnings of the group member you asked to invest. The deductions that you make must be divisible by 3. You can deduct up to 75 cents in each possible scenario.
At the bottom of the screen there is "Calculate" button. When you have entered deductions for all three scenarios you may push it to learn the cost that you will incur to decrease the earnings of the green player you asked to invest. You can revise deductions and recalculate costs until you are ready to finalize your decision. Once you have made your decision click the "Finalize Decision" button to proceed.]
Red Player Assignment Screen
The computer randomly selects one group member to be assigned the role of red player. The remaining three group members are assigned the role of green players. A sample of the screenshot revealing this information is shown below. The red player's profile is shown on the first row and the profiles of the three green players forming the investment group are shown on the second row. Investments can only be made by green players, who form the investment group. Any member of the investment group may invest. The screen also reveals which green player the red player asked to invest in the round.
Decision Screen
The decision screen records the investment decisions for the green players. Listed in the upper right corner is the number of seconds that remain in a round. The button in the center of the screen is used to make your investment decision. Please click this button if you want to invest. The round ends and the decision screen disappears as soon as you or a member of your investment group chooses to invest.
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